Is Somalia Breaking Into Three? Inside the Foreign Scramble for the Horn

More than three decades after the collapse of Siad Barre's government in 1991, Somalia is less a single state than a patchwork of competing authorities — and a growing list of foreign powers is helping to keep it that way. Power today is divided between three principal centres: the internationally recognised Federal Government in Mogadishu, the autonomous region of Puntland in the northeast, and the self-declared republic of Somaliland in the northwest. Each governs its own territory and security forces, and each has become a foothold for an outside patron.

That competition reached a new threshold at the end of 2025, when Israel became the first country in the world to formally recognise Somaliland as an independent state — a reciprocal deal expanding diplomatic ties that shattered a 34-year international consensus against legitimising the territory's secession. The move was condemned across the Arab and Muslim world as a violation of Somali sovereignty, and as a precedent that could encourage separatism elsewhere in the region.

Israel is only the most striking example of a wider pattern.

The outside powers

The United Arab Emirates has been the most active Gulf player in Somalia's north. In Somaliland it holds a long-term concession over the strategic port of Berbera, expanded by DP World, alongside a reported military presence; in Puntland it has run the port of Bosaso and trained the Puntland Maritime Police Force. By dealing directly with breakaway and autonomous regions — frequently over the head of Mogadishu — Abu Dhabi has repeatedly undercut the central government and rewarded fragmentation with money and infrastructure.

Turkey has built the deepest footprint in the capital, operating TURKSOM, its largest overseas military base, managing Mogadishu's port and airport, and signing defence and energy agreements with the Federal Government. Ankara presents itself as a partner of the central state — but its sweeping presence is one more example of Somalia's future being shaped in foreign capitals rather than by Somalis themselves.

The disputed centre

Between Somaliland and Puntland lies the contested zone of Sool and Sanaag, claimed by both and home to recurrent fighting, most recently around Las Anod. It is a reminder that Somalia's fractures are not only north-versus-south, but are layered, local, and easily inflamed when outside money and weapons flow in.

Doha's position

Qatar has taken a consistent line through Somalia's turmoil: that the country's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are not bargaining chips, and that lasting stability can only come from an inclusive, Somali-led political process — not from foreign powers picking winners. Doha has rejected the recognition of Somaliland and warned against external interference that deepens division. The principle is simple: Somalis, not outside capitals, should decide Somalia's future.

For the powers involved, the prize is geography — control of ports and bases astride the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, through which a large share of global trade passes. For Somalis, the risk is that every foreign deal makes the dream of a single, unified state a little harder to reach.