Hormuz, Above and Beneath: Tehran's Twin Toll Push Tests the Gulf's Freedom of Transit

On May 21, Iran's ambassador to France, Mohammad Amin-Nejad, confirmed that Tehran is in active talks with Oman to formalise a permanent toll system for the Strait of Hormuz. Days earlier, Iran's parliament announced the creation of a "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" to administer fees for what it terms "specialised services" provided to passing vessels.

Running in parallel is a second proposal that has drawn less attention but may matter just as much: a push by Revolutionary Guard-linked media to charge transit fees on the subsea internet cables that run beneath the same strait. Taken together, the two initiatives ask whether one of the world's most economically consequential chokepoints — for both energy and data — is to remain an international corridor or become a fee-bearing piece of national infrastructure.

A tollbooth at sea

Reuters has reported that vessels not covered by government-to-government deals have already been paying upwards of 150,000 US dollars for safe passage, with some payment requests reaching higher. Ships transiting from the Gulf are vetted at Iranian checkpoints on Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Larak Island, often by armed personnel. The 330-metre tanker Agios Fanourios I — laden with Iraqi crude bound for Vietnam — was detained until its release on May 16, in one of the more publicised episodes.

Speaking to French media, Amin-Nejad said Iran and Oman must "mobilise all their resources" to manage the strait's security and navigation, and that users would have to pay "their share" through what he framed as a transparent system. The May 16 parliamentary announcement positions the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) as the body administering that arrangement.

The proposal has drawn pointed criticism from outside the region. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called a tolling regime "unacceptable" and "illegal." UAE special envoy Sultan Al Jaber warned it would set a "dangerous precedent" and erode freedom of navigation — language echoed by European governments and shipping organisations.

A tollbooth beneath the sea

On May 9, Iran's military spokesman Brigadier General Ebrahim Zolfaghari announced that Tehran would "impose fees on internet cables" passing through the strait. Tasnim News Agency — affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — has since published a more developed framework: charge the international consortia that own and operate the cables; offer state-controlled maintenance services; and require Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon to operate under Iranian regulations on Iranian-influenced traffic.

Mostafa Taheri, a member of Iran's parliamentary Industries Commission, told local media potential revenue could reach 15 billion US dollars. The Tasnim proposal identifies three of the major cable systems running the strait — FALCON, GBI, and Gulf-TGN — connecting data centres across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Two of them, Falcon and Gulf Bridge International, run through Iranian territorial waters.

The chilling effect is already visible. Alcatel Submarine Networks, the France-based contractor handling much of the regional cable infrastructure, has paused regional repair operations following Zolfaghari's statement, according to The National. Tasnim has separately floated monitoring SWIFT financial messaging and other cross-border data flows — a far more disruptive prospect than transit fees alone.

The legal hole

Iran has cited the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arguing that the strait's narrow geography places its seabed under Iranian and Omani jurisdiction. The catch: Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has never ratified it. UNCLOS's transit-passage provisions are precisely what protect uninterrupted international navigation — and the cables and pipelines beneath it — through chokepoints like Hormuz.

What it means for Doha

Qatar's exposure to a formalised toll regime is structural rather than circumstantial. The country exports roughly 77 million tonnes of LNG per year, almost all of it transiting the strait, and is one of the region's most cable-dependent data hubs. A persistent fee mechanism — whether on tankers or on data — flows, eventually, into the cost base of Qatari exports and Qatari digital infrastructure.

The diplomatic question is sharper than the financial one. A permanent Iran-Oman toll arrangement risks normalising a precedent the Gulf Cooperation Council has long resisted: that the Strait is not international water but sovereign infrastructure that one or two states get to charge for. Qatar has historically preferred quiet diplomacy with Tehran over confrontation, and that posture has served Doha well. But the longer this mechanism operates without a coordinated regional response, the harder the precedent will be to unwind.